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i

As a field of study, comparative administrative law finds itself
relegated to an uncertain place on the fringe of American legal learning. On grounds of merit, it deserves a more central position. This
is especially true in a period which has witnessed a striking expansion
of governmental activities. Arrested in our social vigor by the growing
pains of the modem "service state," we can seek relief only in a clarification of the organizational problems which accompany the transition from the postulates of economic liberalism to the demands of a
balanced industrial order. In this effort we have good reason to take
stock not only of our own national experience but also of those patterms of adjustment which have been evolved abroad.
I
It is no longer a far-fetched assumption that administrative power
is destined to serve as the foremost instrument in securing economic
stability and social peace. One cannot grant the assumption and in
the same breath doubt the utility of careful exploration of the methods
by which administrative power has been reconciled with individual
rights in other countries. To be sure, the peculiarities of each political system make it impossible for one nation simply to imitate the
ways of other nations. But it is no less true that intelligent awareness
of solutions attempted and tested elsewhere would contribute to the
maturity of our own thinking. This rather than any predisposition
toward deliberate eclecticism is the idea which underlies and lends
justifiction to the comparative approach.
In order to embark from a self-evident proposition we may say
that basically identical conditions present themselves in all countries
which have felt the full impact of industrialization. One need not be
reminded of the element of uniformity which the machine age has
superimposed upon the diversity of national mores. Once the case for
government regulation of vital zones of economic life is established,
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few alternatives are left for the forms which the regulatory process
may take. Conversely, the cirdinal issue of retaining the spontaneous
cooperative impulse of the individual remains the same wherever citizenship is associated with political liberty. In view of the conspicuous
acceleration of the American development toward more extensive public control, inquiries formulated in terms of comparative administrative law actually promise greater returns today than they might have
a generation ago.
There is something ironical in the fact that comparative administrative law can point to an imposing pedigree in this country. Goodnow's pioneer work:' stands out as a singular achievement in the perspective of half a century. The same theoretical and practical interest
which sustained his labor was in evidence as an active factor even in
earlier decades. At that time, Continental and American scholarship
were allied through close bonds of intellectual companionship. Circumstances rather than considered choice subsequently caused a parting of ways. American legal thought was progressively absorbed into
problems looked upon as indigenous to our own national growth. Ideological tendencies simultaneously undermined the very conception o-"
a common purpose. Freund 2 seemed to signify the close of an epoch.
By and large, his comparative method had little but academic significance to the younger generation of American lawyers. It required
deeper insight, social as well as economic, to inaugurate a change of
attitude. The emerging reorientation has thus far proceeded at a relatively slow pace, notwithstanding the dynamic pressures behind it.
At this hour, despite the signs of increasing receptiveness toward
the opportunity posed by comparative study, the struggle for national
survival forced upon us inevitably restores the old misgivings about
the value of Continental legal prototypes, whatever their origin and
record. A wealth of facile arguments are marshaled to demonstrate
that totalitarianism is merely a novel guise of firmly rooted national
traditions; that an unbridgeable chasm lies between us and the legal
theory and institutions of those nations which, willingly or unwillingly,
now provide the core of Hitler's ill-famed New Order; and that this
fundamental cleavage existed throughout their entire political past,
even though we sometimes failed to recognize it. Today's totalitarianism is being regarded by many as a still more monstrous expression
of yesterday's authoritarianism. Continental administrative law in
consequence appears incriminated by its alleged authoritarian descent.
It therefore warrants attention only as the exemplum horribile.
i. COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (893).

2. His most representative work is ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND
PROPERTY (1928).
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In such reactions one can discern a mixture of ideological axiom
and political emotion. Neither, however, is compelling as a statement
of fact. Preconceived notions are rarely a dependable guide. Perhaps we should also bear in mind that the Continental system of administrative law has found adoption in widely separate parts of the globe.
Mention may be made especially of Latin America. Up to the present,
it was a more common occurrence to encounter reviews of works of
Latin American authorities on administrative law and justice in the
legal journals of Continental Europe than in those of the United States.
In the face of this situation, it does not make much sense to fall back
on one-sided stereotypes about the never-changing climate of Continental political thought. Far-reaching qualifications must be introduced before we can gain an appropriate vantage point for objective
appraisal.
In other papers the present writer has tried to show the practical
working of Continental administrative law in individual areas of the
administrative process.3 In each of these articles, an effort has been
made to focus comparative analysis on selected court decisions, American and foreign, matched in such a way as to typify concrete alternatives in the judicial response to essentially one and the same administrative situation. Needless to say the "situational" case method is
particularly well suited to illuminate the operation of the different legal
concepts and categories relied upon here and abroad in the adjudication of disputes arising between administrative authorities and private
interests. The following observations are intended to place in relief
some of the premises on which Continental administrative law rests and
to outline in more general fashion some of its most important features.
It is hoped that in this way the reader will obtain a glimpse of the
institutional philosophy which has been woven into the Continental
scheme of judicial review of administrative action. Although a comprehensive treatment would require much more space than is available
within the confines of a single essay, even a brief sketch may be expected to serve the purpose of segregating reality from partisan contention.
II
While Continental administrative law has obtained its specific
content under different national auspices, thus leaving room for doc3. Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: A Note on Review of Discretion (939) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 954; Comparative Administrative Law: Economic
Improvisation by Public Authorities (I94O) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 425; Comparative
Administrative Law: Public Employer-Employee Relationships (1941) 4 U. OF DEmRorr
L. J. 59; Comparative Administrative Law: Exercise of Police Power (1942) go U.
OF PA. L. REv. 266; Comparative Administrative Law: Political Activity of Civil
Servants (1942) 29 VA. L. REV. 52.
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trinal variations from country to country, its fabric is as homogeneous
as the Anglo-American common law. The fundamental unity of its
structure must be traced to the twofold influence of historic interpenetration and intellectual exchange. As to the latter, Otto Mayer's name
suggests itself, who, enriched by his intimate knowledge of French
droit administratif,did much to guide the evolution of German administrative jurisprudence into similar channels. 4 His was perhaps the
most spectacular success as an intermediary, but there were many others
like him eager to look across national boundaries. They set a new
style of legal research and attained in their work and that of their disciples a synthesis which was to remain without counterpart in other
fields of law.
It is therefore entirely proper to speak of Continental administrative law as one system, irrespective of distinguishable shades which
mark the individual national setting. Perhaps it is useful to enumerate its characteristic features. In the first place, despite the sweeping
victories which the codification movement has won all over the Continent, the body of legal rules which govern the exercise of administrative power has originated and has been permitted to develop
organically as judge-made law. Thus it has never ceased to be in formation. Secondly, instead of being confined to a definitely staked out
province, it has continued to expand its orbit, thereby widening step
by step its protective function. Thirdly, through the medium of lower
courts integrated under a supreme court, it has sought close connection with the frontline of administrative action, opening its portals to
the ordinary citizen for immediate and inexpensive redress unincumbered by undue formality. And finally, it has expressed itself through
the voice of a specialized judiciary constituted in such a manner as to
give assurance of first-hand knowledge of the administrative process,
the hierarchy of administrative-courts, informed as well as independent.5 Other points might be added for the sake of completeness,
but none of them would modify this summary in any significant aspect.
American terminology identifies administrative law primarily with
the evolution of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Con4. Ample evidence may be found in his general treatise entitled DEUTSCHES VEa(3d ed. 1924).
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tinental definition draws into itself the whole matrix of relationships
between public authorities and the individual. This is a distinction
of great practical importance. Our courts have largely taken the
view that judicial scrutiny of administrative action should center on
rule-making and adjudicatory activities rather than the day-by-day
conduct of public business itself. Unless determinations of the latter
kind plainly transcend the boundaries of "due process," the courts are
likely to shove such cases off their dockets. 6 The differentiation of
treatment is neither realistic nor fortunate. It obviously cuts right
across the vast ramifications of administrative power, without any
reference to the mechanics of its exercise.
To illustrate, most administrative acts spring from generally
applicable rules and procedures. It is clearly in the interest of the
citizen that administrative demands made on him bear a close relation
to such normative standards because these usually embody directives
which limit the immediate option of any single government agent. A
judicial inclination to challenge rules more readily than manifestations
of administrative choice which do not flow from predeterminations
of a procedural nature is not conducive to genuine respect for legal
principles. It can have only undesirable effects upon the methods by
which administrative decisions are framed, since it places a premium
on a modus operandiwhich more easily leads to arbitrariness. Equally
intertwined with ordinary operations is the exercise of quasi-judicial
power. Indeed, each administrative act calling for compliance carries
with it certain adjudicatory implications, for it involves an investigation
of the relevant facts and a formulation of specific obligations derived
from statutory clauses. The law comes to life in the pronouncement
of the judge, but the same applies to decisions made by administrative
authorities. To administer means in large part to .implement a legislative mandate by regulations and to discharge it by adjudging concrete cases.
The difficulty of isolating in concise terms the quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial elements within the wider range of administrative
action would be almost insurmountable, were it not for the fact that a
shortcut is offered by a structural peculiarity of our scheme of regulatory controls. For practical purposes, it has been possible to resolve
the dilemma by associating both elements with the functions of the
independent regulatory commissions and boards. 7 Admittedly, this is
. 6. For typical examples, see Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: A
Note on Review of Discretion (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 954, at 956 et seq.; Comparative Administrative Law: Public Employer-Employee Relationships (i94i) 4 U.
OF DETRoiT L. J. 59, at 6i et seq.
7. Cf. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTATIVE PRocEss (1938). For a broader conception,
see GELLHORN, FmEDRAL ADMINITRATIVE PRocEEDINGS (1941).
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an entirely pragmatic classification since "delegated legislation" and
administrative adjudication a'e by no means a monopoly of the independent establishments. Nor should it be taken for granted that government regulation of economic activities requires the creation of
special commissions and boards outside the departmental system. Even
Great Britain, perhaps the nearest parallel, has generally preferred to
entrust the regulatory process to ministerial agencies. And the last
word has not been spoken about the future status of our independent
establishments, even though the recommendations of the Brownlow
Committee 8 failed to receive the approval of Congress.
If one turns to the "purely administrative" area, another complication enters upon the scene. It stems from the fact that the borderlines of "due process" are extremely fluid. In the judicial forum, far
removed from the zone of administrative operation, it is often -wellnigh impossible to supply a rational answer to the question whether
or not to repudiate the acts of public authorities. At times, the courts
have ventured forward with more verve than understanding, and the
result occasionally reminds one of the proverbial bull in the china
shop.9 More frequently, however, they have acted on the hypothesis
that it is sounder to leave administrative judgment alone. There is
ground for the suspicion that this hesitation is caused by the perfectly
natural uneasiness which must befall the courts when they are confronted with matters too elusive for any mind devoid of expert knowledge. Many have seen virtue in such timidity, but their blessings
make sense only because it is conceded that our judiciary lacks sufficient familiarity with the stubborn technicalities of administrative
business. Nonetheless, such judicial withdrawal marks a partial defeat
of the "rule of law," to which we seem to reconcile ourselves because
the defeat ordinarily remains hidden.
Measured with the same yardstick, Continental administrative law
bas a more inclusive scope. It has been accorded a distinctive autonomy
side by side with civil law and criminal law. Comprehensive in its
sphere, it surrounds power with restraint. Thus it addresses itself to
the citizen as well as the administrator, furnishing the former with
tangible guarantees of his civil rights and directing the latter to promote the public interest only in accordance with the principle of legality.
It reaches into every phase of the administrative process, and offers
8. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH
(1937). Cf. alsp BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, No. io,
SPECIAL STUDIES

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE EXECUTIVE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT,
75th
(937).
, 9.Cong.,
For Ist
an Sess.
illustration,

see Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law:
88 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 425, at

Economic Improvisation by Public Authorities (940)
426 et seq.
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concrete guidance even on the proprieties of official motivation. Principle-minded, it shows remarkable simplicity in its legal architecture,
making it easy to follow out its prescriptions. One of its chief assets
is its systematic unity.
III

In this respect, Continental administrative law has successfully
counteracted earlier tendencies. Originally, administrative power kept
itself free from judicial supervision. This was in part an aftermath
of absolutism, but to no lesser degree the result of practical considerations. In France, for instance, the uncurtailed extravagance of court
control in the period of dynastic disintegration brought forth a natural
reaction not unlike that caused by the legislative omnipotence fostered
by most of the first state constitutions in the United States.
As Uhler 10 succinctly puts it, "The acute lack of synchronization
of the executive and judicial machinery under the ancien regime in
France had caused serious frictions which could not fail to have disastrous consequences. After the revolution had swept over France,
the leaders of the new regime were greatly concerned with devising
means to prevent the recurrence of similar conditions. To this end they
incorporated Montesquieu's theory of free government in the legislation of 1789 and in the subsequent constitutions, hoping to accomplish
two things: (i)

to secure a new form of . . . government in which

popular sovereignty was reflected, and political liberty established,
through.a legislative body which was independent of the executive;
(2) to insure a system under which the administration could fulfill
unhampered the tasks which the revolution had entrusted to it. These
objectives were to be attained by the separation of the legislative and
executive powers, and by a differentiation of the administrative and
judicial agencies." The resulting division of major functions gained
its principal safeguard in the prohibition of any interference with administrative action on the part of the courts. This working arrangement, although distinguished by consistency, left the citizen without
an independent organ for the review of measures of the bureaucracy,
however grievous their effects. Relief could only be sought through
the channels of complaint procedure. The gap was dosed by the gradual
emergence of the Coneil d'.8tat as a full-fledged administrative court.
At the start, then, administrative justice as an untried innovation
operated within relatively narrow confines. To our way of thinking,
it might have seemed conclusive to expect little change in the scope of
the initial administrative jurisdiction. Yet, the opposite took place.
zo. Op. cit. supra note 5, at

11-12.
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Instead of conceiving judicial review of administrative action as an
exceptional concession, the administrative judiciary widened its concerns through a series of noteworthy precedents. To return to the
French example, the Con~seil d'etat did not need public pressure to
seize upon the concept of service public to enlarge its power of review.
Recognition of this criterion opened up additional opportunities for
redress not only with reference to acts of authority, but also to all
other acts of government management, provided these were linked to
the performance of a public service. In a similar manner, the Thirond
case :" subjected all contracts related to the discharge of governmental
functions to administrative jurisdiction. Patently, the dominant idea
beneath these progressive moves was "to make the special technical fitness of the administrative courts available for the adjudication of all
disputes where it might be desirable." 12 Such technical fitness could
not be hoped for in the "ordinary" judiciary. It was possessed by the
administrative courts because their members were drawn in their
majority from the government career service.
To be selected for such judicial tasks carried high prestige. Only
men of marked ability, thoroughly versed in administrative law, were
chosen for so delicate an assignment. While serving in a judicial
capacity, they were naturally placed outside the administrative hierarchy. Their only superior wag the law itself. No higher authority
was entitled to issue instructions to them, and no administrative court
has furnished ground for the charge of docility toward the powers to
be. On the other hand, the administrative judiciary was eminently
qualified to bring its practical insight into the working of public authorities to bear upon its decisions. Hence it could play a corrective rather
than a negative role. In censoring administrative agencies, it did not
shun the responsibility for devising and suggesting reasonable solutions
for the attainment of legitimate administrative objectives within the
framework of the laws.
Of particular interest is the way in which the administrative courts
accomplished the introduction of legal restraints into the exercise of
discretionary power. While the aims of administrative action can
usually be indicated without much difficulty in statutory provisions, it
is a considerably harder task for legislative bodies to outline the
approach to be followed in reaching these aims. In fitting the law into
a wide diversity of conditions, the administrator must be enabled to
move with a degree of freedom. He must be granted discretion in
ii. Th~rond v. Ville de Montpellier, Conseil d'Atat, S. 1911, 3, 17.

comment on this case, see
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op. cit. supra note 5, at 5o et seq. The decision elic-

ited opinions from several French authorities, vhich are cited ibid. Cf. especially III
HAURIOU, LA JURISPRUDENcE ADMINISTRATVE DE 1892 A 1929 (1929) 685 et seq.
12. UHLER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 51.
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order to proceed, not blindly and with the pointless force of a rolling
stone, but with an eye to the numerous variables of locality and circumstance. In this sense, all enforcement appears as graduations of adaptation, and adaptation does not take place automatically. On the other
hand, since every act of discretion rests on authorization, administrative
freedom is never a personal privilege. It must function with reference
to stated administrative objectives, being the servant of these objectives.
Hence discretion is never completely "free."
Faced with the practical problem of the lawmaker's incapacity for
supplying explicit standards to govern the exercise of discretion, the
administrative courts evolved implicit standards of their own.'3 They
reasoned that discretion, having its basis in statutory authorization, was
necessarily limited by its intended dedication to achieving the concrete
ends encompassed by the statute. To bend it in the direction of other
ends would be an unlawful departure from the authorization. Once
this restriction was recognized, it was only another step to make it the
touchstone for separating proper and improper administrative motivation. Independent of good faith or good intention, no government
officer was permitted to let motives extraneous to the statutory objective
encroach upon his discretionary decision. Action could therefore be
brought based on the contention of improper administrative motivation.
Yet this did not mean that the court would replace the administrator
in his appropriate domain. A sharp line of demarcation was drawn
between the extraneous motive whose presence would invalidate the act
and mere differences of point of view or of judgment. 14 The court's
notions might not always harmonize with the attitude of the government agency, but such disagreements of opinion did not mislead the
court to substitute its own conclusions for those of the government
agency.
Equally revealing of the spirit of Continental administrative justice is the doctrinal development which culminated in the adoption of
the Rule of the Mildest Means. Public authorities are often directed
by law to eliminate conditions which adversely affect the general welfare. In most cases, several means commend themselves for such a
purpose, but the question which of them is most appropriate is seldom
quickly answered. Leaving aside the somewhat simpler problem of
defining a means which is plainly inappropriate, the final choice is a
matter of great concern to the individual called upon to abide by it.
The Rule of the Mildest Means makes him a participant in this choice,
provided he comes forth with a proposal which promises to bring about
13. Cf. Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: A Note on Review of
Discretion (i939) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 954, at 962 et seq.
14. Cf. Morstein Marx, loc. cit. supra note 9, at 436 et seq.
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an effective remedy. In its steady elaboration, this principle gave him
the right to demand sariction of the means which he regarded as least
onerous to him and which at the same time justified the expectation of
meeting the requirements of the public order. Even if he had been
tardy in suggesting such a means, he was deemed entitled to a change
in the administrative determination of the means by making up his
mind afterwards. 15 In the application of these conceptions, the administrative courts encouraged careful weighing of the citizen's interest on
the part of government agencies and also reduced the volume of avoidable litigation.
One who has had the privilege of representing his department
before administrative courts in Republican Germany, and who has
observed the operation of administrative justice in other parts of the
Continent, is apt to be impressed with the high calibre of the judicial
personnel and the efficacy of their approach. They knew their business.
They had no desire to force the administrator into a strait-jacket, but
they were alert to their duties toward the public. With the official file
of the government agency before them, they would unravel with competent hands the threads of the administrative decision at issue, asking
incisive questions which left no obscure aspect untouched. And where
the plaintiff, appearing perhaps without counsel, would prove helpless
and bewildered, they would outline the intricacies of his case in his
stead. All too frequently do we fall into the error of envisaging justice
as concerned with large economic stakes. But administrative impositions, just or unjust, may be as painful to the common variety of people
as to the mighty combine. To a large extent, the administrative courts
,f the Continent.served as popular tribunals, hearing the grievances of
the ordinary citizen.' 6 He was truly the central figure. And he secured
his standing because administrative law, above all else, was every
man's law.
IV
If the ordinary citizen was one beneficiary, the government officer
in charge of public functions was another. When administrative law
is expected to operate as the very charter of public authority, it is
essential that the standards of legality pervade the entire administrative
process. This can never fully be accomplished by utilizing the government lawyer as a technician whose task it is to make the exercise of
power legally foolproof. In rendering a specialized service of such charr5. Cf. Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: Exercise of Police
Power (i942) 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 266, at 276 et seq.

16. For representative examples, ef. Morstein Marx, loc. cit. supra note 13, at 962
et seq.; loc. cit. supra note 15, at 283 et seq.
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acter, the government lawyer functions merely at the periphery of the
administrative motivation. The formulation of steps to be taken in
terms of movements toward policy ends falls to the public manager,
while the government lawyer is asked to design the legal form in which
the end can be attained with the greatest chance of meeting a judicial
test. As to legal form, the government lawyer has the last say. Yet, he
knows little about the operational problems which impinge upon the
planning of the public manager. On the other hand, the latter, as a layman embued with the fear of court interference, is prone to shrink before the magic practiced by the former. In this none too happy relationship lies the explanation of the disproportionate- influence which the
General Counsel and his staff wield in fixing the course of agency policy
and in setting the tenor of American administration.
On the Continent, the ensuing dualism is forestalled by the stress
on legal studies, especially of administrative law, in the preparation for
administrative responsibility. The permanent personnel entrusted with
the direction of government departments below the level of political
leadership generally are by training lawyers as well as administrators.
As a result, legal issues can be resolved by them directly at the point
where they arise in the conduct of public business. In laying out the
,steps for the execution of administrative programs, the question of legal
form is not treated as a separate or separable matter. Although few
government agencies are without specialized legal divisions, the connection between the staff of these divisions and those carrying operational
responsibility is much stronger than in the United States or England.
The operating men are adequately equipped to frame their legal problems in the technical language of administrative law when they deem it
advisable to request an opinion of the legal division. They are able to
state the terms of reference in such a way that the legal staff can recognize the practical implications of the question put before it.
It is, therefore, no exaggeration to say that administration is
devoted to the pursuit of legality as much as it is to the execution of
public policy. 17 In supervising his force, the administrative officer is
under obligation to map out government activities within the bounds of
legal standards. Orders and regulations, as they are issued in the
every-day activity of the department, must bear the stamp of government of laws. Alternatives of action have to be analyzed on the oper17. The historic origins of the emphasis on legal studies in the preparation for
the higher civil service career is traced by Friedrich, The Continental Tradition of
Training Administrators in Law and Jurisprudence(939) 11 J. MOD. HIST. 129. An
appraisal of the training scheme is offered by Brecht, The Relevance of Foreign Experience, in MoRsTn MARx (ED.), PuBac MA~NAGEWZNT IN THE NEW DLocAcy
(940) 107.
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ating level in recognition of legal requirements. Thus administrative
law comes closest to following administrative authority like its shadow.
Little room is left for a juxtaposition of policy end and legal form, or
of the operator's mode of thought and the lawyer's mode of thought.
While initiating government action, the operator is capable of distinguishing between practicability supported by law and practicability
denied by law. In brief, administrative law is made to serve as the
mold of administrative activity. No such intimate interrelation is possible of achievement where knowledge of the law is largely confined to
a group of specialists who carry on their work in a compartment by
themselves.
Lengthy discussions have been going on for quite some time about
the ideal formula for preparing aspirants for the higher government
career. It is reasonably clear that they should not be trained simply
for the work of the legal profession. But a good case can be made to
support the view that in their academic background they ought to
acquire a good deal of competence for appreciating the role of public
law in government activity. This has a significant bearing not only
upon the entire tone of administration but also upon the interplay
between government management and judicial review. There is truth
in the assertion that "no legislative proposals nor new designs for the
judicial or administrative apparatus are of themselves sufficient to
insure the best possible relationship between the two departments of
government. The problem is not merely one of mechanics; it is also
Qne Qf attitudes. In this country administrative autonomy, because of
constitutional conceptions, is to a large extent dependent upon judicial
self-restraint. It is important, therefore, that this restraint should be
carried to the point where the interplay of adjudication and administration becomes cooperative rather than competitive. To this end [in
the phrase of Ralph Fuchs] 'we must learn, as quickly as we may, how
to make popular government at once responsible, capable, and just.'
Manifestly, traditional prejudice against administrative activity, born
of a habit of thinking, is most apt to recede in the proportion that the
tasks assigned to the administrative are customarily well done. Consequently the constant supply of adequately trained personnel to take
over those tasks is essential, and a critical glance at the law schools,
in which a large number of our public servants receive their preparation,
is pertinent. Philosophically there may be no fundamental distinction
between private law and public law. However, in our law schools,
which are primarily geared to preparation for immediate practical tasks,
the differentiation of private and public law courses in the curriculum is
in need of greater emphasis. A better integration of the public law
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courses would be of benefit to our future public servants." 18 In the
light of the measurable advantages which on the Continent have accrued
from such an integration, it does not seem far-fetched to suggest that
legal studies of this kind should be accorded sufficient recognition in a
sound training program for the higher administrative service.
Owing to the prominence of administrative law in the entire scheme
of public management, it is not surprising that one finds legal treatises
by leading authorities side by side with office manuals on the desk of the
Continental administrator. 19 At the same time, law faculties have been
instrumental in prompting administrative courts both through the contributions of scholarship to the growth of judicial doctrine and through
immediate participation of academic teachers as members of the administrative judiciary. This has produced a wholesome blending of theory
and practice, which may in part account for the greater vitality of
administrative law as compared with other fields.
V
Let us now turn to the question which has held considerable attraction to those who are persuaded that Continental administrative justice
is an offensive distortion of the "rule of law". The misconception has
long lingered in our minds that a specialized judiciary recruited in the
main from the government service must naturally gravitate toward an
authoritarian outlook. But authority is something ambiguous and a
tempting object of wishful thinking.
At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish between the different
connotations which can be read into the term "authority". Authority
may be viewed as a mantle of power by which one individual is placed
above other individuals. To be in authority carries with it the demand
for deference and subordination. In this sense, authority seems to
upset the equilibrium of human forces implied by the principle of political equality. Thus authority presents itself as an intruder, to be
limited to a minimum and to be fenced in by legal guarantees. As an
intruder, it must not be permitted to extend beyond essential social
necessities. It must show cause for its very existence, and must be held
to a concrete demonstration of such cause. A corollary may be seen in
the notion that authority as an intruding factor is apt to be inspired by
evil motivations, or at least gives rise to the temptation of ruthless
excesses. Hence, wherever authority is in evidence, suspicion becomes
a civic duty, and judicial control is in order.
18. UHLE,

op. cit. supra note 5, at 73-74.

ig. One might think of such works as HAURioU,

ADMINISTRATIF (4th ed., 1938)
TUNGSRECHTS (8th ed., 1928).

or
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Needless to say, this view falls short of doing justice to the
ideological status of authority within the framework of representative
government. Representative government aims at widespread popular
participation in the political process, but in the execution of policy it
has to rely on authority as a device for insuring the prevalence of the
public interest. Here we encounter authority in a different meaningas an agent of the popular will.20 In its function as an agent of the
popular will, authority allies itself with the common welfare. It turns
into a custodian of the public interest and an arm of temporal justice.
One may therefore say that the presence of authority alone supports the
presumption that public concerns are at stake. In this perspective, the
emphasis rests no longer on restraint of authority, but on the need for
securing adequate recognition of the common interest in the interest of
all. Instead of allowing the individual to block the path of authority
for the sake of his private preference, he is urged to submit to the
requirements of law and order as defined by public policy. We are led
logically to the conclusion that authority is entitled to priority in order
to uphold the stipulations of common necessity.
To regard authority as an agent of the popular will is more
apposite to the conditions of modern industrial society than to decry
authority as an intruder. That does not mean that the two connotations
are mutually exclusive. When authority collides with private interests,
it is likely to cause resentment on the part of the individual affected,
regardless of the justification for government action. On the other
hand, authority must not be allowed to insist upon being accepted at
face value. It does not exist for its own sake. Law cannot automatically police itself, however firmly it may be welded to the legal order.
For these reasons we must try to strike a balance between the two connotations of authority.
As citizens of a democratic polity we reject the notion that authority is always right. Yet, our common interest requires submission to
authority when authority is right. To test the qualification falls neither
to the citizen nor to the exponent of authority, but must be left to a
judicial body free from bias and able to penetrate to the heart of the
issue. Moreover, all authority is derived from authorization and may
legitimately be challenged in terms of the scope of authorization. The
Continental development has encouraged such challenge through the
judicial invention of legal categories which could be applied successfully
by the administrative courts. In the words of a careful student, the
".tendency to enlarge their competence usually expresses the desire of
making, or rather keeping, the expertness and special training of a
2o. This point of view is in evidence especially in DuGuIT, LE DRoiT SocIAL, L
DRorT INDIVIDIEL ET LA TRANSFORMATION D

L'UATAT (3d ed., 1922).
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carefully selected personnel available in all matters which are essentially
and intrinsically administrative. The French system offers few obstacles in this respect, and it has been relatively simple to formulate
concepts which have satisfied this general trend." 21
When there is- reasonable assurance of lawful procedure on the
administrative level itself, judicial review is not in danger of arrogating
to itself the right of constant interference.22 At the same time, the
record of Continental administrative justice shows that informed
judicial guidance has a powerful effect upon the legal orientation of
government agencies. Once such traditions crystallize, neither the
public nor the courts are apt to display undue eagerness for hampering
authority on first sight.
VI
A few words are probably desirable concerning the attitude of the
career administrator toward judicial review. The merit bureaucracy
of our day inevitably plays an important role in the execution of
public policy. Its status and its ethics are not the least conspicuous
factors in the evolution of Continental administrative law.
One of the first to sense with great acuteness the potentialities of
the merit bureaucracy was Gaetano Mosca. 23 His greatest accomplishment must be found in his amazingly accurate forecast of the emerging
pattern of modern government in its adjustment to the needs of the
industrial order. Western civilization in the machine age presented
itself to his eyes as essentially one and the same phenomenon, irrespective of differences in the individual national locale. Writing at the
close of the nineteenth century, he assumed that in the economic realm
private initiative would supply the impetus of a dynamic force setting
the pace of social progress. But he saw far enough ahead to reject the
illusion that an enterprise economy could remain free from public control. The basic standards of control would have to be determined in
the channels of representative government. Although filled with deep
misgivings about the effects of universal suffrage, he realized that
public policy, in order to reflect the best judgment, would require the
unrestricted interaction of many minds, provided these minds were
competent to judge.
21. UHLER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 62.
22. This is the fundamental insight which underlies the recommendations of the
Acheson Committee. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S Co kITTEE ON ADMINIsTRATIVE PRocEDUR, REPORT, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941). But it would be unwarranted to infer that consequently judicial review would lose most of its raison
d'gtre.
23. His chief work has been translated as THE RULING CLASS (Kahn's trams.
1939). The title is unfortunate since the original speaks consistently of the "political
class". Cf. MosCA, F.EMENTI DI ScIENZA POLITICA (1896; 2d ed, 1923). For a comment on the American edition, cf. Morstein Marx, The Bureaucratic State (1939) x
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On the other hand, he was quick to grasp the pivotal distinction
between the policy-making p'rocess, which could not be expected to
benefit from enlightened public opinion without a secure electoral foundation, and the administrative process, which through the continuity of
departmental operations would give effect to policy decisions. To him,
this latter task appeared institutionally as crucial as the proper working
of legislative bodies. It would call of necessity for a carefully recruited
corps of trained functionaries-the merit bureaucracy. Instead of bemoaning the rise of the bureaucratic element, he regarded it as the
natliral counterpoise to the parliamentary structure. Nor did he want
the career officialdom spineless and meek. It was to gain sufficient
strength to make its expertise a telling factor. However, while separate
in their major functions, the representative hierarchy and the administrative hierarchy would have to complement each other and work as
component parts of one single machine.
Even in retrospect, this outline does not lose its boldness, but we
can better appreciate its realism. With the continual decline of the
patronage bureaucracy of yesterday, American administration is changing hands. Men and women inspired by a professional philosophy of
public service are coming to the fore; they do not fit into the antiquated cliches of the Jacksonian tradition. The Continental career
service is much older, but it has produced the same administrative frame
of mind, the same pride of workmanship and the same identification
with the public interest. Coming from the universities, the young
entrants into the higher bureaucracy brought with them the most recent
intellectual tendencies. And as they grew older, their academic training
and their professional interest kept them close to the stream of current
thought. They were able to see the danger of self-isolation behind the
massive walls of administrative power. As members of a profession,
they were also alive to the need for lawful procedure. Moreover, in the
judgments of administrative courts they were confronted with judicium
parium. Hence it is no longer startling that the beginnings of administrative justice and its gradually widening scope did not arise so much
from public pressure as rather from the initiative of the career element.2 4 Without the full support of the merit bureaucracy, judicial
24.

It

is interesting that in the delimitation of the administrative jurisdiction

against the jurisdiction of the "ordinary" courts, technical considerations have remained
in the foreground. Thus, French administrative law has given rise to a special conceptual construction under which certain acts emanating from the administrative
sphere, but so completely dissociated from all lawful authority as to assume an erratic
character, are assigned to the exceptional jurisdiction of the "ordinary" courts. Such an

act would be "administrative trespass". To quote UHLER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 148i49: "The utility of the concept of administrative trespass and the necessity when
applying it of appraising separately the impeached act, as distinguished from its con-

sequences, derive logically from the peculiar situation brought about in France by the
interpretation of the separation of powers. It is true that the adjudication of private
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review could not have been refined into an efficient tool of legal control.
That such support was freely given in itself testifies to the satisfactory
record of the Continental alternative.
VII
The existence of a specialized judiciary presupposes an organizational division within the judicial system. On grounds of unity of the
court structure, this may seem undesirable. No doubt it necessitates
certain technical adjustments. But if unity demands a price as high as
that of inept handling of disputes involving administrative acts, a dual
scheme is bound to lose its reprehensible aspects. No other device is
available for turning judicial review into a constructive force.25 As a
negative and disruptive influence, judicial review is not prevented from
deteriorating into an unqualified liability in the context of the "service
state."
In the more recent past, we have become increasingly mindful of
the price we are paying for the structural unity of the judicial power.
rights and the dispensation of relief in the event of the violation are generally deemed
to be within the exclusive province of the judicial courts. But whenever acts of administrative agencies are involved, the question of their propriety and legality can, according to prevailing doctrine, be passed upon only by the administrative courts and must
always be referred to them. Under the constitutional and statutory protection guaranteeing administrative autonomy, the administrative courts are the sole judges of the
formal validity, the administrative legality of such acts. The administrative department therefore will ordinarily not tolerate its own acts to be condemned, except by its
own judicial machinery. It is always directly concerned with the act and its administrative purpose, although the judicial courts may deal with its collateral or secondary
effects. However, now and then these effects are so drastic as to Jbe wholly out of
proportion to the original administrative object. May it not be assumed then that at
such a juncture the administrative department is no longer interested in being identified with the act, and therefore does not insist upon submission of the question of legality for its determination? Is it not more convenient, and less injurious to the administrative prestige, to abandon the enfant terrible to be branded a voie de fait and to be
disciplined at the hands of a judicial court?"
25. This point is stressed by Dickinson, The Acheson Report: A Novel Approach
to Administrative Law (1942) 9o U. op PA. L. Rav. 757. His penetrating comment
deserves full quotation: "As a practical matter, it would seem to be almost inevitable
that the initial stage in the administrative process, the original or first determination,
should be primarily administrative, giving full effect, in the first instance, to the policy, or perhaps what may even be called the bias, of the agency in applying its interpretation of the law. Of course, this is not to say that the hearing officer who presides at this original stage of the proceedings should not act fairly, permitting the
introduction of all relevant evidence, and listening with attention to the arguments
addressed to him so that a record can be made upon which subsequent stages of the
proceedings can be based. He can and should be expected to show this degree of independence. Nonetheless in making his findings, it is almost inevitable that the inferences drawn from the evidence, and the evidence accorded determinative weight, will
be the inferences and the evidence which support what the agency is trying to do. If
there is to be correction it must come later. If the inferences and the evidence are to
be filtered through a dispassionate glass, if conclusions are to be drawn which are not
dictated by the desire to further the agency's policy without regard to individual rights,
then it would seem that the process of filtration and of drawing conclusions must necessarily take place somewhere else than within the agency. If this is true, the adoption
of the Committee's recommendations would have slight, if any, effect in achieving the
objective which judicial review exists to accomplish, and there would at the same time
be introduced into the administrative machinery a novel, cumbrous and expensive element resulting in no correspondingly important advantage." Id. at 776-777.
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Proposals for a Court of Appeals for Administration 2 6 or for a High
Administrative Court 27 have been advanced in various quarters. The
expectations which lend support to these proposals are well summed up
by Frederick Blachly when he says: "In addition to simplifying control
over administrative action, thus making it understandable, the establishment of such a court would greatly decrease the cost of litigation to
individuals and to the government, would help to clarify the distinction between public law and private law, and would tend to develop
a systematic and easily understood administrative law." 28 The lesson
of Continental administrative justice makes it abundantly clear that it
is not an empty vision to hope for this overdue adjustment through
creation of a specialized judiciary.
It is worth mentioning, however, that a specialized judiciary
involves more than setting up one single court. In order to carry
administrative justice toward the ordinary citizen, it must fan out over
the entire administrative system so as to gain proximity to the work
performed by the field service. Judicial review functions best when its
lines of communication are not overtaxed. Field operations account
for a large share of contemporary government business. Legal issues
arising in the field should find judicial attention close to the point of
their origin. This also accords with the conveniences of the individual.
If a thorough examination of the administrative situation involved in
each dispute is to take place, it must at least have its beginnings on the
spot. Circuit duty imposed upon the members of a High Administrative Court would soon prove too heavy a burden and thus invite undesirable shortcuts. Moreover, the large mass of administrative litigation
does not require the time and energy of a High Court. The public
interest would be adequately served if facilities were provided for
adjudication on a lower level. Once a competent judge has spoken, the
interest in an independent forum is in most cases satisfied. We must
not imagine that there will be a flood of appeals. On the other hand,
if regularly established lower courts are lacking, all disputes would
inevitably go to the High Court, thus swamping it with business which
29
could easily be taken care of elsewhere.
We have arrived at the threshold of the "service state," not because
of advance commitments of a theoretical character written into the Constitution, but because of conditions inherent in industrial society. As a
26. As provided in the original Logan Bill, S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
The proposal was later abandoned by its sponsors.
27. Cf. Blachly and Oatman, A United States Court of Appeals for Administration
(1942) 221 ANNALS 170, at 181-182.

28. Id. at

182.

On this question, much of the argument has tended to run along political lines.
Cf. Special Committee on Adm. Law, A. B. A. REP. (1936) 2o9.
29.
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going concern, government is compelled to rely to an ever growing
degree on the effectiveness of the administrative process and the
momentum behind it. Resourceful administration can be insured only
by safeguarding the creative freedom of public management. This
freedom may turn into a peril unless it is tempered with accountability.
Internal accountabiilty is readily secured through the hierarchical organization of the executive branch, heading up to the Chief Executive.
External accountability to the elected representatives of the people is
more problematical since it funnels through the Chief Executive, involving only his own power of direction. Most of the concrete manifestations of administrative power occur far below the sphere of control
within his reach. It is a practical impossibility simply to refer the
aggrieved citizen to the good offices of his political representative. He
must be able to meet administrative power by invoking administrative
law. But redress would be a dubious victory if it entailed the destruction of authority when rightfully operating as the agent of the popular
will.
Up to now the orthodox viewpoint has been that the supremacy of
law is virtually annulled by any deviation from the principle of unity
of the judicial power.30 Leaving aside terminological quibbling, it is
difficult to see how such a notion can survive straightforward analysis
of the Continental alternative. It would be more appropriate to say that
a well-constructed system of administrative justice, given a reasonable
chance, is likely to reinforce legality in the exercise of administrative
power and thus to contribute to full recognition of the "rule of law" in
an area of vast importance in which it might otherwise lead only a
shadowy existence.
30. Cf. (938) 63 A. B. A. REP. 331, at 341. See also comment by UHLER, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 177-178.

